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Abstract
Three types of market traders, including momentum traders, contrarian traders and fundamentalists, are introduced to an 
evolutionary game model as market players, and their payoff structures are given. Based on a discrete replicator equation, a 
dynamic system is defined, and then its evolutionarily stable states are presented, which correspond to different market 
price evolving processes, including the stationary price fluctuation around the fundamental value, the increasing (decreasing)
price bubble and the stationary, fluctuating positive (negative) price bubble.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade, the literature on modeling financial markets by incorporating heterogeneous agents and
bounded rationality has increased[1-8]. These models share two fundamental characteristics. The first is that
the heterogeneous agents have different expectations about the future price evolution and have different forms
of the asset demand function. Therefore they result in different market performance (measured by the expected 
profit or realized profit). The second is that the heterogeneous agents can adapt their beliefs over time by 
choosing from different expectation patterns and changing their market strategies based upon their past 
performance, and heterogeneity, learning, adaptation and evolution can be incorporated into this type of 
adaptive belief system [9-10]. Obviously, these fundamental characteristics make the modeled financial market 
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analogous to the ecological system. This means that we can introduce evolutionary game theory to study the 
financial market. Evolutionary game theory focuses on the dynamics of strategy change more than the 
properties of strategy equilibria and avoids strong assumptions of rationality to admit bounded rationality[11-
12]. The successful application of this theory has brought further insights to financial systems[13]. 
Therefore, in this paper, we will adopt evolutionary game theory to model an asset market with classic 
heterogeneous traders, composed of fundamentalists, momentum traders and contrarian traders. The 
momentum and contrarian strategies are two basic technical strategies in financial market[14]. Here we suppose 
that momentum traders hold trend-following expectations and contrarian strategy traders conceive trend-
reversal expectations on the asset price. In this paper, we present different evolutionarily stable states of the 
evolutionary game and the corresponding market price dynamics, including the stationary price oscillation 
around fundamental value, the increasing (decreasing) price bubble and the stationary, fluctuating positive 
(negative) price bubble. Compared with the rational bubble theory[15], this model incorprates the stationary 
fluctuating positive (negative) price bubble to the increasing (decreasing) price bubble. In this sense, these 
results can be regarded as an extension to the rational bubble theory. Considering the bounded rationality of 
market traders, bubbles in our model can s  The remainder of this 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 contains the main theoretical analysis 
and results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The model 
In this model, we suppose a population of three group players: the first group comprises momentum traders 
with a share of x, the second group comprises contrarian traders with a share of y, and the third group 
comprises fundamentalists with a share of 1-x-y. All the traders can shift from one group to another, and are 
matched randomly at each trading period. 
When a trader meets another trader who is in the same group, they share homogeneous expectations and 
will have no real trade, leading to a zero-payoff. Thus, trade only happens between different groups. In 
particular, when a momentum trader meets a contrarian trader, they hold heterogeneous expectations and will 
trade with each other. We suppose that the excess demand of a momentum trader is ( )M te sgn p ,and the 
excess demand of a contrarian trader is ( )C t Me sgn p e , where ( ) 1sgn is a sign function. Then the 
payoff of a momentum trader is 1M te p , and the payoff of a contrarian trader is 1C te p
excess demand is ( )F f te sgn p p ; when he matches with a momentum trader or a contrarian trader, he can 
only achieve a trade if he and his counterpart have opposite excess demand , which means his payoff would be 
1 ( )M t M Fe p H e e  or 1 ( )C t C Fe p H e e , where ( , ) (0,1)H is a Heaviside step function. In a similar way, we 
M
C  denotes fundamentalist. 
Table 1. Payoff structure of the game with the momentum trader (M), contrarian trader (C) and fundamentalist(F). 
 M (x) R (y) F (1-x-y) 
M x  0 eM 1tp  eM 1tp H(-eMeF) 
R  (y) eR 1tp  0 eR 1tp H(-eReF) 
F (1-x-y) -eM 1tp H(-eMeF) -eR 1tp H(-eReF) 0 
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Supposing the price change is determined by the excess market demand, we take price dynamics as 
1 [ (1 ) ]t M R Fp xe ye x y e ,which leads to 
 
,                                                   (1) 
 
,                                                                            (2) 
 
 
,                                                                               (3) 
 
Thus, the expected payoff of a momentum trader is
 
 
,                                    (4) 
 
the expected payoff of a contrarian trader is 
,                                    (5) 
 
and the expected payoff of a neutralist is 
 
.                                                         (6) 
Where ijA  denotes the payoff matrix as shown in Table 1.  
Then the expected payoff of the total population is 
(1 ) 0M R Fx y x y .                                                                                                          (7) 
The continuous replicator equations can be given in the following form 
 
.                                                                                                                        (8) 
 
Considering that we adopt price difference in market dynamics, here we use their corresponding discrete 
form to describe the population dynamics. 
 
(9)            
 
Therefore, we have the following two equations to describe the dynamic system:  
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The market price dynamics is described as   
(11) 
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3. Equilibrium and evolutionarily stable state 
First, without loss of the principle of stability analysis, we can divide the system evolution into three 
complete situations by the value of M Fe e . The three situations are listed as follows: 
(1) There exists time t , for every t t , 1M Fe e ; 
(2) There exists time t , for every t t , 1M Fe e ; 
(3) There exists time t , for every 0t t , there exists time 1 0t t , 0 1( ) ( ) 1M F t M F te e e e , 1M Fe e . 
We do not include the situation of 0M Fe e  because we can always give the system minimal perturbation to 
make 0M Fe e  , and this kind of minimal perturbation will not change the final results of the system stability. 
We then discuss system the stability under the three situations one by one. 
3.1. Situation 1: , . . , 1M Ft s t t t e e  
It can be proved that this situation can be excluded from the real world. The most straight-forward 
explanation for this argument is that ( )F f te sgn p p will eventually go to -1 (or +1) when ( )M te sgn p  
keeps taking 1 (or -1).  
3.2. Situation 2: , . . , 1M Ft s t t t e e  
Just from the analysis of Situation 1, we can see that this situation can appear in the real world. Therefore, 
we can study the evolution of the dynamical system (1) after time t . In this situation, the dynamic replicator 
equations can be reduced to 
 
(12) 
 
The price dynamics is reduced to 1 (2 1)t t Mp x e . 
Solving equations (12) we can easily obtain the equilibria of the dynamic system:
1
 (1,0),(0.5, )m and 2(0, )m , 
where
1 2
0 0.5,0 1m m . 
Applying stability analysis to all the equilibria, we can obtain the evolutionary behaviors of system (11) 
when 1( )M Fe e t  (see Fig.1), where the equilibria (1,0) and 2 2(0, )(0 1)m m are evolutionarily stable states .  
 
Fig.1. The equilibria (1,0) and 2 2(0, )(0 1)m m are evolutionarily stable, while 1 1(0.5, )(0 1)m m are unstable. Every initial point in 
the area of { ( , ) : , 0, 1x y x y x y } will converge to the steady state solution (1,0) and 2 2(0, )(0 1)m m . 
1
1
(1 )(2 1)
(1 2 )
t t t t
t t t t
x x x x
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It is easy to obtain the market price dynamics in different evolutionarily stable states. For state 
2 2(0, )(0 1)m m , which corresponds to the coexistence of momentum traders and fundamentalists, the price 
dynamics is a regular fluctuation around the fundamental value (see Fig.2.a). For the state 1,0 , which 
corresponds to the mono-existence of momentum traders, the price dynamics is a persistently positive or 
negative bubble(see Fig.2.b). 
 
 
(a)                                                                           (b) 
Fig. 2. (a) The price dynamics of the stable states 2 2(0, )(0 1)m m ;(b) The price dynamics of the stable state of 1,0 . The upward line 
corresponds to the positive initial value of Me , , and the downward line corresponds to the negative initial value of M
e . 
3.3. Situation 3: 
0 10 1 0
, , , . .( ) ( ) 1M F t M F tt t t t t s t e e e e  
In this situation, there exists a switch in the sign of the term M Fe e . Supposing that 1t  is the first period which 
satisfies 1 0t t and 0 1( ) ( ) 1M F t M F te e e e , we can prove that 1t should be 0 1t . Exploring further, we can see that 
only the case[ 1 1( ) ( ) ,( ) ( )F t F t M t M te e e e ]can appear in the real world. In this case, there exists a unique, 
asymptotically stable equilibrium (0,1) (see Fig.3). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.3. The equilibrium point (0,1) is an evolutionarily stable state where 1 1,( ) ( ) 1,( ) ( )M t M t F t F tt e e e e . 
 The market price dynamics corresponding to the unique evolutionarily stable state with different initial 
prices are shown in Fig.4. 
price dynamic behavior. We have confirmed these conclusions with numerical simulations.  
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Fig.4. The price dynamics corresponding to the evolutionarily stable state (1,0) 
4. Conclusion 
In sum, the dynamic model presents three steady states with homogeneous traders, corresponding to sole 
fundamentalists, sole momentum traders and sole contrarian traders, respectively, and mixed states with 
fundamentalists matching contrarian traders. These steady states exhibit price dynamic processes, including 
fluctuations around the fundamental value, the increasing (decreasing) price bubble and the stationary, 
fluctuating positive (negative) price bubble. The highlights of this model lie in its straightforward dynamic 
mechanism of market evolution and neat results with strong economic meaning.    
It is reasonable to argue whether the evolutionary scenarios in our model incarnate a real asset market 
process. At first glance, some of our evolutionarily stable states are far removed from real market behaviors; 
because they imply that the market participants eventually converge at a homogeneous trade strategy, and in 
these states the market will have no trade volume. In fact, not so as the general heterogeneous agent-based 
model, our model also cannot reproduce some common stylized facts in financial market, including excess 
volatility, skewness and excess kurtosis, fat tails, and volatility clustering[16]. 
Apparently, this disadvantage is mainly due to the simple assumptions of this model, which ignores some 
practical factors such as random shocks to fundamental value, noise in strategy shift, entry and exit of 
participants, liquidity demand. For instance, in real financial markets, there usually exist stubborn 
fundamentalists or trend traders, and passive liquidity traders, and their populations cannot be wiped out 
entirely. It is disappointing that these realistic factors are difficult to include in a model based on the 
evolutionary game framework. This may be the cost of a deterministic dynamic model stemming from the 
evolutionary game framework. On the whole, when the advantages of the evolutionary game framework are 
taken into consideration, the cost is offset. 
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